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ABSTRACT
As e-commerce becomes more prevalent, states increasingly
struggled to collect use taxes. Residents who purchase products
online are subject to the use tax; however, they rarely report the use
tax they owe because many are unaware that such a tax exists. States
are constitutionally unable to impose use tax collection duties on
many online retailers, because there must be a substantial physical
nexus between the state and the retailer to do so. This Note
considers the current practices that states employ in use tax
collection, and examines the three different methods that purportedly
allow for states to impose use tax collection duties on online
retailers, even without a substantial physical nexus. This Note
proposes that states should continue to utilize the tools and practices
available to them in a more efficient way for use tax collection rather
than create a new tax scheme as the three methods propose.
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INTRODUCTION
Panic struck Californian consumers in early September 2012 as a
law requiring certain Internet companies to more efficiently collect the
sales and use taxes owed on e-commerce transactions teetered on the
precipice of effectiveness.1 Californians increased their spending by
eight to ten percent on the merchant website Amazon in the thirty days
preceding the effective date of the law,2 not realizing that their online
purchases were already subject to use tax that had simply remained
unreported and uncollected.3 Every state with a sales tax also has a
corresponding use tax at the same rate,4 which is applied to items that
were bought out-of-state but used within the state.5

1. See Andrea Chang, Californians Spend Freely On Amazon.com Before Sales
Tax Deadline, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2012, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/
sep/05/business/la-fi-amazon-shopping-spree-20120905.
2. See Jane Wells, Binge Buying in California Before the ‘Amazon Tax,’ CNBC
(Sept. 13 2012, 4:26 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/49023713/Binge_Buying_in_
California_Before_the_039Amazon_Tax039.
3. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 6201, 6201.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2013
Reg. Sess.).
4. See Donald Bruce & William F. Fox, E-Commerce in the Context of Declining
State Sales Tax Bases, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1373, 1374 (2000), available at
http://ntj.tax.org/wwtax%5Cntjrec.nsf/1ED27F6240C4EF0B85256AFC007F33C3/$FIL
E/v53n4p31373.pdf.
5. See David H. Gershel, Comment, The Day of Reckoning: The Inevitable
Application of State Sales Tax to Electronic Commerce, 14 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 335, 338–39 (2011).
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Throughout the last century, states have attempted to expand their
taxing powers by mandating that businesses collect sales and use taxes;6
however, the Supreme Court has limited states’ power to burden certain
companies with this additional obligation.7 The Court has held that
there must be a substantial physical nexus between the state and the
entity upon which the state wishes to impose this duty.8 However, the
rapid development of the Internet and e-commerce has increased
consumers’ ability to shop from remote vendors that lack the necessary
substantial physical nexus with their home states.9 As a result, less tax
has been collected.10
To increase the amount of taxes actually collected, some states
began implementing tax laws targeted at e-commerce businesses such as
Amazon.11 These laws became known as “Amazon tax laws” and
created a substantial physical nexus between remote vendors and their
affiliates when certain conditions were met.12 Some of these laws have

6. See Chris Atkins, Establishing Physical Presence: Borders Online Case
Reveals Court Disharmony in Applying Physical Presence Rules to State Sales Taxes,
TAX FOUNDATION (Sept. 26, 2006), http://taxfoundation.org/article/establishingphysical-presence-borders-online-case-reveals-court-disharmony-applying-physical.
7. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); Nat’l Geographic
Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753
(1967), overruled by Quill, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (overruling the due process analysis of
Nat’l Bellas Hess, but expanding on its commerce clause analysis); Scripto, Inc. v.
Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960); Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335
(1944); McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
8. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 314–15.
9. See Atkins, supra note 6.
10. See Gershel, supra note 5, at 339.
11. See id. at 343–44.
12. See William V. Vetter, Conjuring Jurisdiction Through Presumption–Affiliate
Nexus Legislation, 21 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES 6, 9–10 (2012) (“If (a) the
seller/alleged tax collector meets all the following conditions: 1 Has no political or
physical nexus with the state. 2 Sells tangible goods or services that eventually become
subject to use tax in the state. 3 Has an agreement with a state resident to provide any
consideration in exchange for the resident’s direct or indirect referral of a potential
customer to the seller. 4 Has cumulative gross receipts exceeding $10,000 during the
preceding four quarterly periods ending on the last day of February, May, August, and
November from state residents referred by all persons described in item (3). Then, (b)
the seller/alleged tax collector is presumed to be soliciting business in the state through
an independent contractor or other representative and, therefore, must act as the state’s
use tax collector.”) (internal citations omitted).
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been challenged in court under the Due Process or Commerce Clause of
the Constitution.13 At least one court has held that an Amazon tax law
was unconstitutional.14 Amazon’s responses to the laws have ranged
from making deals with the state to postpone effective start dates of the
laws to terminating the affiliate programs within states enacting such
laws.15
As negative consequences resulting from the Amazon tax laws
have developed, such as not allowing certain states to reap the benefits
of e-commerce affiliate programs, alternative tax schemes have been
proposed to mandate e-commerce companies to collect sales and use tax
while conforming to the law.16 A proposal by Travis Cavanaugh is
similar to that of the Amazon tax law structure; he proposes that the
substantial physical nexus be created by the relationship between the ecommerce company and the customers that use the websites as a market
to sell goods.17 Cavanaugh’s proposal of the Intermediary Tax is based
on the idea that there is a stronger physical nexus argument between the
customers that use a website as a market rather than the affiliates that
use a website as a contractor.18 David Gamage and Devin Heckman
have proposed another alternative: the “Adequate Vendor
Compensation” scheme.19 They propose that states can mandate ecommerce companies to collect sales and use taxes if states completely
compensate the companies for their burdens.20 This proposal attempts to
satisfy the current legal standards without additionally burdening

13. See Performance Mktg. Ass’n v. Hamer, No. 2011 CH 26333, 2012 WL
2090791 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 7, 2012); Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation
& Fin., 913 N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 2010).
14. See Performance Mktg., 2012 WL 2090791.
15. See David Streitfeld, Amazon, Forced to Collect Tax, Is Adding Roots, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2012, at A1; Associates Program Operating Agreement,
AMAZONASSOCIATES (Apr. 1, 2013), https://affiliate-program.amazon.com/gp/
associates/agreement?ie=UTF8&pf_rd_i=assoc_footer_content_newlogin&pf_rd_m=A
TVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_p=&pf_rd_r=&pf_rd_s=assoc-center1&pf_rd_t=501&ref_=amb_link_359035362_10.
16. See Travis Cavanaugh, Note, Iowa Can Do Better Than the Affiliate Tax: A
Proposal for an Intermediary Tax, 97 IOWA L. REV. 567 (2012); David Gamage &
Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of E-Commerce, 92 B.U.
L. REV. 483, 484 (2012).
17. See Cavanaugh, supra note 16.
18. See id.
19. See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 16, at 484.
20. See id. at 503.
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companies in their efforts to collect the state sales tax.21 The argument
behind this proposal has not been supported by any court.22 The states
that do currently collect sales and use taxes employ two main methods
to collect use tax: through the state’s individual income tax return and a
separate use tax return.23
This Note argues that some of the current practices utilized by
states could be employed more efficiently to increase use tax
compliance. Part I of this Note examines the legal background of states’
consumer use tax collection. This Part further provides the current legal
parameters that must be met for a state to mandate that a company
collect sales and use tax. It also discusses what a use tax is and what the
states’ powers are in directing companies to collect these taxes. Finally,
Part I discusses the evolution of use tax collection law as it pertains to
remote vendors.
Part II of this Note provides an analysis of the Amazon tax laws,
Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax proposal, and Gamage’s and Heckman’s
Adequate Vendor Compensation proposal.24 It also examines states’
current efforts to collect the use tax. This Part further describes each tax
scheme’s implementation and the respective potential positive and
negative consequences associated with each methodology. Finally, Part
II analyzes the various practices that states employ to collect use tax and
discusses the positive and negative effects of each scheme.
Part III of this Note argues that states have the ability to increase
consumer use tax compliance by implementing tools already available to
them. This Part maintains that states should use these practices rather
than create an entirely new, and potentially illegal, tax scheme. Part III
compares the consequences of implementing one of the new tax
schemes surveyed above to those of current state practices.

21.
22.
23.

See id.
See id. at 516.
See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, Research Dep’t, Minn. House of
Representatives, Use Tax Collection on Income Tax Returns in Other States (Apr.
2012), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/usetax.pdf.
24. See Cavanaugh, supra note 16; Gamage & Heckman, supra note 16, at 484;
Vetter, supra note 12, at 9–10.
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I. USE TAX BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW
Sales and use taxes first appeared in various states’ tax codes in the
beginning of the twentieth century.25 To date, forty-five states have
sales and use taxes.26 The collection of these taxes has proved to be
extremely important to each state’s tax bases.27 As a result, the power of
the states’ to compel companies to collect these taxes has become a
debated issue over the years.28 Part I of this Note provides an overview
of the nature of sales and use taxes, as well as explains the judicial
evolution of the states’ limitations of taxing power over remote
vendors.29 Subsection A discusses the distinctions between sales and
use taxes and describes the current tax landscape across the country.
Subsection A also describes the development of the states’ powers and
limits imposed by the Due Process and Commerce Clauses regarding
taxing remote vendors. Subsection B briefly discusses the due process
requirements for a state to tax certain parties. Subsection C details the
evolution of the power to impose tax collection by remote vendors
within the frame of the Commerce Clause. Finally, Subsection D
discusses the most recent Supreme Court decision, Quill Corporation v.
North Dakota, regarding sales and use tax collection on remote vendors.
A. SALES AND USE TAXES
Most states impose sales and use taxes on property,30 though the
two taxes, both resulting from economic transactions, are distinct.31
Sales taxes are imposed on property that is purchased within the state,
while use taxes are “tax[es] on the enjoyment of that which is
purchased.”32 Each state that imposes a sales tax also has a

25.
26.

See Atkins, supra note 6, at 1.
See Scott Drenkard, State and Local Sales Taxes at Midyear 2012, TAX
FOUNDATION (July 31, 2012), available at http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-andlocal-sales-taxes-midyear-2012.
27. See STEVEN MAGUIRE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41853, STATE TAXATION OF
INTERNET TRANSACTIONS 1 (2011).
28. See infra Part I.B–C.
29. See infra Part I.B–C.
30. Currently, forty-five states levy statewide sales and use taxes. Alaska,
Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon are the five states that do not. See
Drenkard, supra note 26.
31. See 67B AM. JUR. 2D Sales and Use Taxes § 135 (2d ed. 1962).
32. McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944).
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corresponding use tax.33 To prevent consumers being taxed twice,
generally when a sales tax is applied the purchase becomes exempt from
use tax.34 Sales and use taxes thus can be mutually exclusive.35 Use
taxes are calculated by applying the current sales tax rate on the item
purchased online or in another state and subtracting the amount of taxes
already paid within that state or online.36
The sales and use tax rates vary from state to state.37 Because of
the incongruities of the states’ tax systems, multistate businesses operate
in a complex environment.38 The Multistate Tax Compact created the
Multistate Tax Commission (“MTC”), “an intergovernmental state tax
agency working on behalf of the states and taxpayers,”39 whose mission
it was to encourage a more uniform tax system across the states.40
Similarly, the Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board (“SSTGB”) is an
organization dedicated to creating a more efficient sales and use tax
system.41 The SSTGB created the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax
Agreement between twenty-four states aiming to lessen the burden of
complying with the tax rules by fostering a more consistent tax system
between the states.42
States that collect sales and use taxes rely heavily on the collection
of those taxes.43 Approximately one-third of the states’ budgets are

33. See Andrew J. Haile, Affiliate Nexus in E-Commerce, 33 CARDOZO L. REV.
1803, 1806 (2012).
34. See Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335, 336 (1944) (“The
use of property the sale of which is subject to Iowa's sales tax is exempted from the use
tax, but the sales tax can be laid only on sales at retail within the State.”) (internal
citations omitted).
35. See 67B AM. JUR. 2D Sales and Use Taxes § 1.
36. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 2.
37. See MAGUIRE, supra note 27.
38. See About Us, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD,
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=About-Us (last visited Mar. 9,
2013) (citing Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) and
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)).
39. MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, www.mtc.gov/About.aspx?id=40 (last visited
May 22, 2013).
40. See id.
41. STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD, supra note 38.
42. See id.
43. See generally NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & THE NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET
OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES (2011).
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derived from sales tax.44 States lose approximately $10 billion of taxes
from e-commerce due to the complications of collecting sales and use
taxes from those transactions such as the fact that states cannot force
companies to collect sales or use taxes without a physical nexus between
the state and the retailer.45 States therefore need a more effective way to
collect sales and use taxes on e-commerce purchases than the current
standard.
B. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND TAXATION
The latest Supreme Court case to opine on the taxation of remote
vendors, Quill Corporation v. North Dakota, suggests that there are two
due process requirements for state sales and use tax laws to legally reach
the covered transactions.46 The first is “some minimum connection[]
between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.”47
The second is “that the income attributed to the State for tax purposes
must be rationally related to ‘values connected with the taxing State.’”48
As Due Process Clause interpretation has evolved in its view of judicial
jurisdiction, the minimum connection required between state tax laws
and businesses has transformed as well.49
In 1945, the Supreme Court held in International Shoe v.
Washington50 that for a forum state to have jurisdiction over a defendant,
the defendant must have “minimum contacts that arise out of or are
connected to the forum state.”51 The Court subsequently held in Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz in 1985 that it was not necessary for a
commercial entity to have a physical connection to the state to create
jurisdiction if the commercial entity “‘purposefully directed’ [its efforts]
toward residents of [that] state.”52 In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, the
44. See id. at ix (“Within state budgets, about 40 percent of general fund revenue is
from personal income tax, 33 percent is from sales tax, and seven percent is from
corporate tax, with the rest from various other sources.”).
45. See Michael Mazerov, Should States Require Online Retailers to Collect Sales
Tax?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970204528204577007511298359048.html.
46. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
47. Id. (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954)).
48. Quill, 504 U.S. at 306 (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. G. D. Bair, 437 U.S.
267, 273 (1978)).
49. See id.
50. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
51. Id. at 316.
52. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
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Court ruled that due to the evolution of Due Process law, it is
unnecessary for a commercial entity to have a physical connection with
a state in order to establish an “imposition of a duty to collect a use tax”
on the commercial entity.53
To meet due process standards for sales and use tax, the Supreme
Court maintained that the “dissociation” between business transactions
and states does not hinder the states’ ability to mandate certain
companies to collect use taxes.54 The opinion of the Court was not that
the use tax must have some connection between the seller’s transaction
and “the seller’s activity within the state.”55 Use taxes satisfy due
process standards for sales and use tax because these taxes are related to
items consumers use within the state lines.56 Individual states have
imposed sales and use taxes since the Great Depression, and courts have
upheld their ability to do.57 Thus, the central issue is not whether remote
vendors can be taxed, but rather whether they are mandated to collect
use taxes from state residents that will be using the products within the
state.58
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF USE TAX JURISPRUDENCE
In 1944, the Supreme Court delivered two opinions on cases
concerning sales and use taxes on remote vendors.59 These cases,
McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co and General Trading Co. v. State Tax
Commission of Iowa, were pivotal to the development of state sales and
use tax policies as the Court defined the constitutional boundaries of the
states’ abilities to compel companies to collect sales and use tax.60 The
Court specifically relied on the Commerce Clause to support its findings
that states could not impose “tax[ation] on the privilege of doing
interstate business.”61
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.
Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 560 (1977).
Id.
See McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 331 (1944).
See Amelia Landenberger, Note, How Battles Over Collection of Sales Taxes
on Online Sales Will Affect Small Businesses-Especially Affiliates of Large Sellers Like
Amazon.com, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 225, 225 (2012).
58. See Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335, 338 (1944).
59. See McLeod, 322 U.S. at 327; Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 335.
60. See McLeod, 322 U.S. at 327; Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 335.
61. Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 338.
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In McLeod, the state of Arkansas sought to tax the sales
transactions between its residents and a Tennessee corporation.62 The
corporation did not have any physical connections with Arkansas; it
solicited customers within Arkansas through its sales employees located
within Tennessee via telephone.63 The Court held that the transactions
occurred within Tennessee.64 Thus the Court ruled that Arkansas
exceeded its power by mandating tax collection as the transactions the
state sought to collect on occurred within another state.65 The Court
recognized that there were distinct differences between sales and use
taxes, as they are complementary and are attributed to two different
purposes.66 Finally, the Court addressed the overall goal of the
Commerce Clause in its limitation of each state’s powers over
transactions not connected to that state.67
McLeod’s sister case, General Trading Co., directly addressed the
ability of states to compel retailers to collect use tax on behalf of its
citizens.68 Iowa’s tax code included a provision requiring Iowan
retailers to collect use tax from its residents.69 A Minnesota corporation
employed traveling salesmen that solicited orders within Iowa.70
Although these orders were solicited within Iowa, the technical state of
purchase was Minnesota, where the contracts were executed.71 The
Court held that Iowa was within its limits of the Constitution and the
Commerce Clause as it was not discouraging to interstate commerce
when it mandated the Minnesotan corporation to collect use taxes from
Iowan residents.72 The Court also noted that it was common for states
to impose tax collection duties on companies.73 Thus, states have the

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See McLeod, 322 U.S. at 328–29.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 330.
See id. (“The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of
free trade among the several States.”).
68. See Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335, 336 (1944)
(deciding whether Iowa may collect such a use tax from a Minnesota corporation).
69. See id.
70. Id. at 337.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 338 (citing Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940)).
73. See id. (citing Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 93, 94 (1934)).
Interestingly, Justice Jackson dissented from the majority opinion and declared, “The
transaction of sale is not taxed and, being clearly interstate commerce, is not taxable. So
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ability to mandate companies that meet the necessary conditions to
collect sales and use taxes on behalf of the state.74
Since these two decisions, the Supreme Court has heard four other
cases addressing states’ abilities and limits to collect use tax.75 The
Court eventually created a four-prong outline of the minimum criteria
for a state to impose taxes on interstate activities.76 The Court applied
the test to sales and use taxes collected by interstate companies.77 In
1960, in Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, the Court found that independent
contractors working as salesmen for an out-of-state company satisfied
the substantial nexus requirement.78 In this case, a Georgia company
utilized ten salesmen within the state of Florida who would send the
orders made to Georgia to finalize the transaction.79 The Court held that
there was no “constitutional difference” within the meaning of “physical
nexus” between independent contractors and employees that were hired
for sales solicitation.80 On the issue of whether a state could mandate a
company to collect use tax, the Court in Scripto upheld its previous
decision in General Trading Co. that such tax collection is permissible.81
Seven years later, in 1967, the Court held in National Bellas Hess
Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of State of Ill. 82 that if the only connection
between the company and the state was a “common carrier or the United
States mail” then that state lacked the power to mandate use tax
collection on that company.83 A Missouri clothing retailer transacted
with Illinois residents strictly by mail; the corporation would mail
catalogs to customers in Illinois, who would mail their orders back to
we are holding that a state has power to make a tax collector of one whom it has no
power to tax.” Id. at 339 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
74. See id. at 338.
75. See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977);
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overruled by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504
U.S. 298 (1992); Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
76. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 287.
77. See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 430 U.S. at 558.
78. See Scripto, Inc., 362 U.S. at 213.
79. See id. at 211.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 212 (citing Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335,
338 (1944).
82. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967),
overruled by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
83. Id. at 758.
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Missouri.84 The Court emphasized that the corporation had no other
contacts with Illinois and further observed that this situation epitomized
the focus of Commerce Clause protection as the relationship was
“exclusively interstate in character.”85
While considering the
constitutional implications of the use of U.S. mail and common carriers
as a sufficient nexus, the Court held that the primary intention of the
Commerce Clause was to maintain a national economy without the
interference of “local entanglements” such as differences in tax rates
among state and local governments.86
A decade after National Bellas Hess, Inc., the Court created a fourprong test in the 1977 case Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady that
applied to all taxes that were to be imposed on interstate commerce
activities.87 The first prong indicates that the “activity . . . [must be]
sufficiently connected to the State to justify a tax.”88 The second prong
orders “that the tax . . . [must be] fairly related to benefits provided [to]
the taxpayer,” and the third prong requires “that the tax [not]
discriminate against interstate commerce.”89 Finally, the fourth prong
mandates “that the tax is . . . fairly apportioned.”90 The Court
constructed this test in response to a Mississippi tax directed at interstate
commerce.91 Courts may rely on previous versions of the tax statute
unless it results in “any effect forbidden by the Commerce Clause.”92
The four-prong test has thus affected the constitutionality of the
application of use tax collection by individual states.93 The Complete
Auto Co. test has become the legal minimum criteria that must be met
for a state to impose a tax on interstate activity.94 Thus, sales and use
taxes imposed on companies in other states are subject to the same
minimum criteria.95
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id. at 754.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 759–60.
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 275.
Id. at 285 (citing Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358
U.S. 450 (1959)).
93. See, e.g., Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546, 2012 WL 1079175
(D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012); Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin.,
913 N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 2010).
94. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)
95. See id.
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In that same year, the Supreme Court applied the new test in
National Geographic Society v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization.96 National
Geographic Society (“Society”), a D.C. corporation, had two offices
located within the state of California that were strictly used to generate
ads for its magazine.97 California sought to compel the Society to
collect use tax from its consumers within the state.98 The Society
maintained that California lacked the “nexus” needed to reach the
corporation.99 The Court affirmed the California Supreme Court’s
decision that the Society’s offices satisfied the nexus standard; however,
the Court stressed that it had not adopted the “‘slightest presence’
standard of constitutional nexus” as put forth by the California Supreme
Court.100 The Court then addressed the other three prongs of the
Complete Auto Co. test, holding that they had been fulfilled.101 The
Court found that a connection between the commercial transaction and
the state and the actual “activity” of the company and the state was
unnecessary.102
D. THE FINAL WORD FROM THE SUPREME COURT: THE QUILL CASE
In 1992, the most contemporary Supreme Court decision regarding
sales and use tax, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,103 came before the
Court. North Dakota asserted that Quill Corp., a mail order business
that did not own any property or have any employees working or
residing within the state, was required to collect use tax from its
customers residing within the state.104 The Court had the option of
overruling National Bellas Hess, as North Dakota challenged the
validity of the decision based on the Due Process Clause, believing the
holding was outdated due to societal technological developments.105

96. See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 558
(1977).
97. See id. at 552.
98. See id. at 553.
99. See id. at 554.
100. Id. at 556.
101. See id. at 558.
102. See id. at 560.
103. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
104. See id. at 303.
105. See id. at 301 (quoting State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203,
208 (N.D. 1991)).
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The Court acknowledged that although the due process case law had
progressed within the last quarter century, the holding in National Bellas
Hess continued to be good law because of its Commerce Clause
analysis.106 The Court found that through its strict due process analysis,
Quill would be subject to use tax collection because of the company’s
actions “within” the state.107 However, the Court held that the
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in Complete Auto and National Bellas
Hess continued to be good legal precedent, and so Quill was not subject
to the tax provision.108
The Court distinguished the due process issues from the Commerce
Clause issues by noting that due process analysis involves “fundamental
fairness of governmental activity” while Commerce Clause analysis
deals with the relationship between the states and the national
economy.109 The Court upheld the National Bellas Hess decision by
holding that Quill Corp.’s only connection with North Dakota was
through common carriers, which did not fulfill the substantial nexus
requirement portion of the Complete Auto test.110 The Court emphasized
that, “[T]he bright-line rule of [the physical-presence requirement] of
[National] Bellas Hess furthers the ends of the dormant Commerce
Clause” in that it relieves interstate companies from “undue burdens” of
participating in the national economy.111 Although affirming its
decisions in National Bellas Hess and Complete Auto, the Court invited
Congress to take action on the parameters of use tax collection within
the mail-order industry.112

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See id. at 307–11.
See id. at 308.
See id. at 314.
Id. at 312.
See id. at 317–19.
See id. at 314–15 (citing 15A AM. JUR. 2D Commerce § 102 (2012) (“Under the
dormant Commerce Clause, state regulations cannot directly discriminate against
interstate commerce, i.e., favor in-state over out-of-state economic interests. The
dormant Commerce Clause prohibits the states from imposing restrictions that benefit
in-state economic interests at out-of-state interests’ expense, thus reinforcing the
principle of the unitary national market.”) (internal citations omitted)).
112. See id. at 318.
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II. ANALYSIS OF THREE THEORETICAL SCHEMES TO “FULFILL” THE
CURRENT SUBSTANTIAL NEXUS REQUIREMENT AND THE CURRENT
PRACTICES OF STATES TO COLLECT USE TAX
Part II of this Note describes the current conflict between the
theories behind the Amazon tax laws, Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax,
and Gamage’s and Heckman’s Adequate Vendor Compensation scheme
that purportedly fulfill the requirements of Quill and the application of
the current use tax collection policies. Subsection A describes the
current Amazon tax laws that have been implemented, and illustrates the
framework of Travis Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax proposal and David
Gamage and Devin Heckman’s Adequate Vendor Compensation
proposal.113 Subsection A also speculates on and analyzes the potential
benefits and negative consequences of each theory. Subsection B
illustrates the current state efforts to have consumers report and pay
their use taxes. It also discusses the use of individual income tax
returns, separate use tax returns, notification campaigns, the threat of
penalties and availability of exemption periods, the improved
relationship between the taxpayer and the states’ departments of
revenue, and the advantages and disadvantages of each practice in
collecting use taxes.114
A. THEORETICAL METHODS OF CIRCUMVENTING THE SUBSTANTIAL
PHYSICAL NEXUS REQUIREMENT
Subsection A describes the current tax schemes and the tax scheme
proposals’ attempt to abide by the current law as established in Quill.
Subsection 1 provides a detailed illustration of Amazon tax laws.
Subsection 2 discusses Travis Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax proposal,
and Subsection 3 describes David Gamage’s and Devin Heckman’s
Adequate Vendor Compensation proposal.115
1. Amazon Tax Laws
“Amazon tax laws,” or affiliate nexus laws, are laws that certain
states imposed in order to capture use taxes that have gone uncollected

113.
114.
115.

See Cavanaugh, supra note 16; Gamage & Heckman, supra note 16, at 484.
See infra Part II.B.
See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 16.

2013]

INCREASING TAX COMPLIANCE

1105

in the past due to states’ previous inability to mandate tax collection on
remote vendors such as Amazon.com.116 These laws are especially
important due to the increased amount of shopping via e-commerce.117
The increased amount of online shopping theoretically should not have
had an effect on each state’s tax revenue since consumers have always
been liable for the use tax on items they purchase online.118 Ecommerce companies, however, exploited a loophole for consumers;
consumers are either unaware or refuse to report and pay the correct
amount of use tax that they are historically liable for.119 There have
been two types of “Amazon tax laws” passed by state legislatures.
Currently seven states collect use taxes from Amazon through their
“Amazon tax laws.”120 To prevent other states from implementing
similar laws, Amazon entered into agreements with several states to
establish physical ties in an attempt to postpone the collection of use
taxes.121
a. New York’s Amazon Tax Law: The Standard
New York’s “Amazon tax law” has become the standard affiliate
nexus law.122 The law establishes a nexus to remote vendors via in-state
affiliate members.123 Affiliate members are those persons that contract
116. See Gershel, supra note 5. These types of laws are known as “Amazon tax
laws” because states have had a difficult time collecting use taxes on the large amount
of purchases made through the retail website amazon.com.
117. See MAGUIRE, supra note 27, at 1.
118. See supra Part I.A.
119. See Gershel, supra note 5, at 339.
120. States Where Amazon Collects Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2012, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/09/12/us/states-where-amazon-collectstaxes.html?ref=technology.
121. See Streitfeld, supra note 15.
122. See id.
123. See Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 913 N.Y.S.2d
129, 132–33 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney
2012) (“The statute . . . created a presumption that an out-of-state seller was soliciting
business [in New York] through an independent contractor or other representative if the
seller enters into an agreement with a resident of this state under which the resident, for
a commission or other consideration, directly or indirectly refers potential customers,
whether by a link on an internet website or otherwise, to the seller, if the cumulative
gross receipts from sales by the seller to customers in the state who are referred to the
seller by all residents with this type of an agreement with the seller is in excess of ten
thousand dollars during the preceding four quarterly periods ending on the last day of
February, May, August, and November.”)).
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with companies such as Amazon to promote certain products on the
website.124 After consumers click the link on the affiliate’s website
taking them to the vendor’s site, they can make a purchase; if this
happens, the affiliate gets a percentage of the sale from the vendor.125
Just two days after the New York tax law was signed into law in
2008, Amazon filed suit alleging that the law was unconstitutional.126
The company claimed that the law violated the Commerce Clause
because Amazon did not have a physical connection with the state;
Amazon claimed that the law also violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses.127 The appellate court ultimately remanded the case
for further discovery for the Commerce Clause and
Due Process claims.128 Thus, New York State does not yet know if its
Amazon tax law is constitutional.129
b. Colorado’s Failed Amazon Tax Law
Colorado’s unique e-commerce tax statute requires out-of-state
retailers to notify customers of use taxes, send its customers an annual
report on their total purchases in order for them to determine the
appropriate amount of use tax, and send each customer’s annual report
to Colorado’s Department of Revenue; this was challenged by a
business association representing companies that generate business
through the internet, mail order catalogs, and the like.130 The District
Court for Colorado held that Colorado’s tax law discriminated against
out-of-state vendors, putting them in the unpleasant situation of
complying with the burdens of providing annual purchase reports to
their customers or collecting the use tax for the state themselves.131 The
court held that Colorado’s e-commerce statute violated the Court’s
holding in Quill because it “impose[d] burdens on out-of-state retailers”

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See id. at 189–90.
See id. at 190.
See id. at 191.
See id. at 191–94.
See id. at 207–08.
See id.
See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546, 2012 WL 1079175, at *2
(D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012).
131. See id. at *5–7.
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that had no physical nexus with the state.132 As of now, Colorado has
yet to mandate the collection of use tax from remote vendors.133
c. Amazon’s Response to the Growing Trend of Amazon Tax Laws
Amazon’s reaction to the passage of Amazon tax laws has ranged
from litigation, making deals, to dropping its affiliate programs in
certain states.134 As discussed below, Amazon has also responded by
challenging the constitutionality of various Amazon tax laws and has, at
times, been successful.135 Amazon has also entered into various deals
with several states, forestalling the collection of sales taxes by agreeing
to build warehouses or distribution centers, thereby creating a physical
nexus within the state.136 These deals have been made with California,
Indiana, Nevada, New Jersey, Tennessee, Texas, South Carolina, and
Virginia.137 These agreements may also further benefit Amazon by the
issuance of tax breaks such as when South Carolina gave Amazon
corporate tax breaks in exchange for it opening a warehouse in the
state.138 Amazon has also simply cut its affiliate program in certain
states as a result of the passing of affiliate nexus tax legislation.139
Amazon has urged Congress to adopt a uniform sales tax law that would
close the loophole created by Quill allowing remote vendors to sell
products to consumers on a massive scale in states where they do not
132.
133.
134.

Id. at *8.
See States Where Amazon Collects Taxes, supra note 120.
See Jim Brunner, States Fight Back Against Amazon.com’s Tax Deals,
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, available at http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/
2017895493_amazonsalestax03.html.
135. See Streitfeld, supra note 15.
136. See Brunner, supra note 134.
137. Robert W. Wood, Widespread Amazon and Internet Taxes Coming Soon,
FORBES, June 17, 2012, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/06/
17/widespread-amazon-and-internet-taxes-coming-soon/. Amazon began collecting
taxes in California on September 15, 2012. Interestingly, a spike in purchases by online
shoppers occurred in the period prior to the commencement of the tax collection by
Amazon. See Chang, supra note 1.
138. See Brunner, supra note 134 (“When word emerged that Amazon.com was
hunting for new warehouse sites, leaders in this business-friendly Southern state rolled
out a welcome mat of tax breaks to lure the Internet retailer. Code-naming their effort
‘Project ASAP,’ South Carolina officials offered up more than $33 million in
incentives, including free land, a property-tax cut and payroll-tax credits.”).
139. See Associates Program Operating Agreement, supra note 15 (deeming
applicants from Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, North Carolina, and Rhode
Island ineligible to participate in the program).
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have substantial physical nexuses.140 The Marketplace Fairness Act, at
the time of this publication, has been passed by the Senate and has yet to
be voted on by the House of Representatives.141
d. Potential Benefits of the Amazon Tax Laws
There are benefits associated with implementing affiliate nexus
laws. The state has a guaranteed collection of its sales and use taxes.142
While businesses that have physical nexuses and locations within the
state must collect sales and use tax, remote vendors that meet the
specifications within each state’s affiliate nexus laws will have to collect
taxes as well.143 As many taxpayers are unaware of the existence of the
use tax, the affiliate tax laws will increase the tax revenue currently
coming into the state.144 The implementation of Amazon tax laws will
also be more convenient for taxpayers. Even if taxpayers are aware that
there are use taxes applicable to purchases made online, it is still a
cumbersome process to calculate the amount of use tax owed.145 If ecommerce remote vendors calculate and collect the tax for consumers, it
will mean less work for taxpayers during tax season.
140. See Tax Reform: What It Means For State And Local Tax And Fiscal Policy:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Paul Misener,
Vice President of Global Public Policy, Amazon.com).
141. See S. 743, 113th Cong. (2013) (as passed by Senate, May 6, 2013); Bill
Summary & Status, 113th Congress, S.743, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d113:SN00743:@@@D&summ2=m& (“[The Market Place Fairness
Act] [a]uthorizes each member state under the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax
Agreement (the multi-state agreement for the administration and collection of sales and
use taxes, adopted on November 12, 2002) to require all sellers not qualifying for the
small-seller exception (applicable to remote sellers with annual gross receipts in total
U.S. remote sales not exceeding $1 million in the preceding calendar year) to collect
and remit sales and use taxes for remote sales under the provisions of the Agreement,
but only if such Agreement complies with the minimum simplification requirements
relating to the administration of such taxes, audits, and streamlined filing set forth by
this Act.”). While the Marketplace Fairness Act has been passed by the Senate, there is
speculation that the House will pass the bill. See David John Marotta, Marketplace
Fairness Act Adds Automation to Tax Confusion, FORBES, May 12, 2013, available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidmarotta/2013/05/12/marketplace-fairness-act-addsautomation-to-tax-confusion/.
142. See Chang, supra note 1.
143. See Gershel, supra note 5, at 343–44.
144. See id.
145. See supra Part I.A.
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e. Speculative Negative Effects of the Amazon Tax Laws
Although the implementation of affiliate nexus laws may increase
revenue for the states’ budgets, it may lead to less-than-ideal
consequences. These Amazon tax laws may be unconstitutional because
of their attempt to get around Quill’s physical nexus requirement.146
Alternatively, e-commerce companies may just end their affiliate
programs, like Amazon did in Rhode Island.147 These laws may also
prompt remote vendors to increase their prices for goods in order to deal
with the increased cost of complying with sales tax reporting and
collection duties.148 Finally, the enactment of Amazon tax laws does not
solve the problem of use tax noncompliance.149
At least one court has held that an affiliate nexus tax law is
unconstitutional. A Cook County Circuit Judge in Illinois struck down
the Illinois affiliate nexus tax law on April 25, 2012.150 Judge Robert
Lopez Cepero held that the Illinois law violated the Commerce
Clause.151 This is currently the only court ruling on the constitutionality
of an affiliate tax law, as the New York court has yet to rule on its own
affiliate tax law.152 The continued implementation of affiliate tax laws
may give rise to more challenges to the constitutionality of these types
of laws.153

146.
147.

See cases cited supra note 13.
See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Amazon Drops More Affiliates to Avoid Tax, WALL
ST. J., June 30, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB124630810805070105.html.
148. See Austan D. Goolsbee, The Impact of Sales Tax on E-Commerce, CAPITAL
IDEAS, Summer 2000, available at http://www.chicagobooth.edu/capideas/sum00/
goolsbee.html.
149. See supra Part I.A.
150. Media Alert: Cook County Circuit Judge Robert Lopez Cepero Strikes Down
“Amazon Tax” Law in Illinois, ILLINOIS POLICY INSTITUTE (Apr. 25, 2012),
http://www.illinoispolicy.org/news/article.asp?ArticleSource=4813.
151. See id.
152. See Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 913 N.Y.S.2d
129, 145 (App. Div. 2010); Sean Craig, Click-Through Nexus Struck Down in Illinois,
LEXISNEXIS COMMUNITIES, TAX LAW COMMUNITY (May 2, 2012, 8:54 AM),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/taxlaw/blogs/taxstaff/archive/2012/05/02/illinoi
s-court-strikes-down-click-through-nexus.aspx.
153. See Amazon.com, LLC, 913 N.Y.S.2d at 145; Craig, supra note 152.
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Many people shop online because of convenience and the potential
for cheaper prices.154 Mandating that e-commerce companies calculate
and collect sales tax in all forty-five jurisdictions that have such a tax
creates an extra expense for these companies.155 The companies may
have to increase prices in order to reflect this added expense.156
Consumers may be discouraged from purchasing from these companies
as the prices increase.157
Making remote vendors responsible for collecting taxes that are
already owed to the state does not fully solve the problem of the
uncollected use tax.158 Consumers can and will still owe use tax on
items that they buy over the Internet, but they will buy from companies
that are not subject to the Amazon tax laws or make their purchases in
other states.159 As the constitutionality of Amazon tax laws are
uncertain, academics have sought to come up with proposals that would
allow the state to impose the collection of taxes by out-of-state
companies while simultaneously satisfying Quill.160
2. Intermediary Tax
Travis Cavanaugh presents one proposal to collect sales and use tax
from remote vendors, specifically Internet retailers, through the creation
of an Intermediary Tax.161 Cavanaugh’s tax scheme is similar to that of
the affiliate nexus tax format; rather than establishing a substantial
nexus with affiliates, however, the state establishes a substantial nexus
with those vendors that use the Internet site as an intermediary, or
forum, for facilitating their transactions.162 Thus, internet retailers, such
as Amazon and eBay that provide “marketplaces” for residents of any

154. See Shopping Online: Convenience, Bargains, and a Few Scams,
INVESTOPEDIA (July 12, 2009), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/08/buy-sellonline.asp#axzz2NLydJO4f.
155. See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 16, at 484.
156. See Mazerov, supra note 45.
157. See Wells, supra note 2.
158. See Gershel, supra note 5, at 338–39.
159. See id.
160. See Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 913 N.Y.S.2d
129, 146 (App. Div. 2010); Craig, supra note 152.
161. See Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 581–83.
162. See id.
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state, would have to collect the appropriate sales tax on the merchandise
due to their relationship with these in-state vendors.163
a. The Implementation of the Intermediary Tax
Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax has two components necessary for
implementation.164 The first is the definition of an “intermediary” and
the second is the creation of a “rebuttable presumption” that a physical
nexus exists between the company and the state if certain criteria are
fulfilled.165 Cavanaugh offers an example definition of an intermediary
by stating that it “should include any business that enters into
agreements with residents of the state to provide a forum or service that
allows in-state residents to sell their goods or merchandise in exchange
for compensation.”166 The rebuttable presumption for establishing a
sufficient substantial nexus that fulfills the Constitutional requirement
for interstate commerce would be operative once the retailer earned a
certain amount of revenue from in-state residents.167
b. Potential Advantages to the Implementation of the Intermediary Tax
There are four potential advantages associated with Cavanaugh’s
Intermediary Tax: a stronger substantial nexus, giving companies less
legal room to avoid collecting taxes; an increased amount of companies
would be affected and required to collect tax; and a tax more “directly
related” to the intermediary activity rather than those of affiliates.168
There is an argument that a stronger substantial nexus exists between
sellers using remote vendor websites as forums for retail rather than as
advertising agents.169 The argument is that there are more sellers than
advertisers that have contracts with remote sellers to use their forum to
sell goods.170 Also, intermediaries that are in the business of selling

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See id. at 583.
See id. at 582.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 583.
See id. at 583–87.
See id. at 583–84.
See id. at 584 (“Additionally, the revenue generated from intermediary
contracts is likely to be much more significant than the revenue generated from
affiliates in the state. Sales on the Amazon Marketplace accounted for thirty percent of
total units sold on Amazon.”).
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products online automatically have a sales or use tax responsibility,
while affiliates do not.171 The second potential advantage is that remote
vendors such as Amazon or eBay are not likely to stop providing a
forum for their in-state sellers, since much of their bottom line comes
from this service.172 Thus, the in-state sellers will continue to be able to
utilize the remote vendors’ services.173 The third possible benefit would
be that the retailers selling to customers directly would collect the tax
rather than the company facilitating those transactions.174 Finally, as the
intermediary tax is designed to have remote vendors collect sales tax on
items that are actually sold from within the state (which would not be
considered under the use tax since it is bought and sold within the same
state), sales tax that should be collected in certain instances (when instate sellers sell to in-state buyers) will be guaranteed to be collected
through this intermediary tax.175
c. Potential Negative Aspects of the Intermediary Tax
There are three potential negative consequences if an Intermediary
Tax were to be implemented.176 The first potential issue is that it may
not be constitutional; the similarity of Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax to
the current affiliate nexus taxes makes its constitutionality
questionable.177 Cavanaugh notes that contractual relationships between
intermediaries and the remote vendor companies may not satisfy the
Quill “substantial-nexus test.”178 He also makes the point that there may
be a constitutional issue because the remote vendor is paid for
facilitating a market for the intermediaries, while the consumers are
compensating the intermediaries for the goods and not the remote
vendors for their services of providing a market.179 Currently, the
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See id.
See id. at 585.
See id.
See id. at 586.
See id.
See id. at 587.
See id. at 583.
Id.
See id. at 587 (“In contrast, the intermediary tax involves residents of the state
entering into contracts with Amazon for Amazon to provide a forum for the resident to
sell their goods. Unlike both Scripto and the affiliate tax, the intermediary tax involves
state residents seeking vendors' services; it is Amazon, not the state resident, receiving
compensation for those services.”).
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affiliate-nexus tax statutes are dependent on the Scripto decision, in that
the remote retailers contract with affiliates to “solicit sales for the
retailer.”180 Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax scheme, however, cannot
presume that the holding in Scripto will apply, as it is the in-state
residents paying the remote vendor to use its services.181
The second speculative negative aspect of an Intermediary Tax
scheme is the impact on other more traditional marketplace forums.182
The definition of any intermediary provided by Cavanaugh is not
complete, but the basic foundation he recommends is not only specific
to e-commerce.183 If legislators are not careful in drafting an
intermediary tax law scheme, there is the potential that states will be
able to mandate the collection of sales tax from other forums, such as
shopping malls, flea markets, and green markets, rather than from the
vendors that these facilitators accommodate within their marketplace.184
Finally, Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax proposal may give a
competitive advantage to those retailers who choose to have a store on
eBay or Amazon rather than have a separate website as a retailer.185 As
the intermediary would be responsible for collecting the sales and use
taxes for the transactions, smaller retailers may choose to forego
collecting sales tax on their own through their website in order to avoid
costs, and transfer that duty to the remote vendor.186 Remote vendors
would then acquire the original responsibility of that smaller retailer.187
3. Adequate Vendor Compensation
David Gamage and Devin J. Heckman offer another proposal to the
affiliate nexus tax that aims to comply with Quill in the application of an
“Adequate Vendor Compensation” scheme.188 Their proposal is
dependent on an assumption that Quill stands for the prohibition of use
tax collections that are burdensome on remote vendors and that if the
remote vendors are adequately compensated for the burdens of use tax
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 587–88.
See id. at 587.
See id. at 582.
See id. at 583–83.
See id.
See id. at 584–86.
See Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 581–82; Gamage & Heckman, supra note 16,

at 484.
187. See Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 581–82.
188. See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 16.
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collection, there would be compliance with the use tax law
jurisprudence.189 Thus if a state employs an Adequate Vendor
Compensation program to those remote vendors on which it seeks to
impose use tax collection obligations, then the burdens on interstate
commerce that concerned the Court in Quill should be alleviated.190
a. Methods of Implementation
Gamage’s and Heckman’s Adequate Vendor Compensation scheme
can be applied in various ways.191 To fully compensate remote vendors
for their compliance with use tax collection mandates, the states would
have to reimburse both fixed and variable costs associated with the
remote vendors’ compliance.192 This basic principle applies to each of
the proposed ways to implement an Adequate Vendor Compensation
scheme.193 All costs must be refunded to the remote vendors in order to
comply completely with Quill against burdening interstate commerce.194
One of the first potential ways described by Gamage and Heckman to
collect all of the costs associated with use tax collection compliance
would be to apply a program similar to that used by Utah in
compensating only for certain tax collection-related costs incurred by
vendors.195 Utah compensates certain vendors for their outlays on tax
collection tools such as computers and associated software.196 Another
method offered by Gamage and Heckman would be to allow for those
remote vendors that collect use taxes to retain a percentage of the tax
money that they collected in order to cover the costs of that collection.197
States that utilize this practice, such as Wyoming, find that this method
is more practical to implement, but does not allow for the compensation
of the specific amount of money outlaid by the vendor on the use tax
collection.198

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See id. at 503.
See id. at 506.
See id. at 509–11.
See id. at 506.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 509.
See id. (quoting 2006 Utah Laws 2023-24).
See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 16, at 509.
See id.
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Gamage and Heckman believe that the most efficient system by
which to reimburse these use tax compliance costs to remote vendors
would be to use elements of both methods.199 By allowing vendors to
either retain a certain percentage of the tax revenue they collect or
demonstrate to the state’s department of revenue the amount that they
outlaid on supplies for use tax collection, remote vendors would be
given various options to get the sufficient amount of money to cover
their compliance costs.200 To ensure that maximum compliance costs
will be covered for the remote vendors, Gamage and Heckman believe
experts should be employed to compute adequate rates.201 Remote
vendors may be compensated at a certain rate depending on the amount
of revenue they collect from in-state residents.202 Gamage and Heckman
suggest that states implementing one of these potential schemes may
choose to exempt certain remote vendors from collecting use taxes if the
Adequate Vendor Compensation amount for that company proves to be
more of a cost than a benefit.203
b. Potential Advantages of the Adequate Vendor Compensation Plan
There are a few potential advantages that could arise out of state
implementation of Gamage’s and Heckman’s Adequate Vendor
Compensation plan.204 One benefit would be the guaranteed collection
of use taxes on most sales from remote vendors, which might remedy
the problem of not collecting the use taxes from consumers.205 Another
potential advantage would be that the Adequate Vendor Compensation
plan might discourage remote vendors such as Amazon and eBay from
199.
200.
201.
202.

See id. at 510.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 511 (“According to another study by PricewaterhouseCoopers in
2006, the national average for annual sales tax compliance costs amounted to 3.09% of
total tax collections in 2003- with small retailers’ costs amounting to 13.47% of tax
collections, medium-sized retailers’ costs amounting to 5.2% of tax collections, and
large retailers’ costs amounting to 2.17% of tax collections. Hence a jurisdiction might
set the default compensation rates at 15% of tax collections for small vendors, 7% of
tax collections for medium-sized vendors, and 3% of tax collections for large
vendors.”). For the PricewaterhouseCoopers study, see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 1
RETAIL SALES TAX COMPLIANCE COSTS: A NATIONAL ESTIMATE (2006), available at
http://www.bacssuta.org/Cost%20of%20Collection%20Study%20-%20SSTP.pdf.
203. See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 16, at 508.
204. See id. at 526.
205. See id.
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canceling their affiliate programs that also bring income into the state
through income taxes.206 Gamage and Heckman also believe that the
Adequate Vendor Compensation scheme would increase the likelihood
that e-commerce purchase reporting statutes such as the one that
Colorado attempted to implement will be upheld as constitutional.207
They speculate that this is possible because the burden of providing the
reports would be alleviated by compensating the companies which
would relieve Commerce Clause issues.208 Lastly, the Adequate Vendor
Compensation plan could incentivize states to create a more consistent
tax system across state lines because states would want to minimize the
costs associated with tax collection compliance. Thus the more
simplified tax system across states, the easier, and less costly, tax
collection would be.209
c. Potential Negative Aspects of the Adequate Vendor Compensation
Plan
The Adequate Vendor Compensation proposal is rooted in the
assumption that states have the ability to fully compensate remote
vendors for both tangible and intangible costs.210 Gamage and Heckman
note that the adequate vendor compensation methods will most likely
lead to the overcompensation of many remote vendors.211 While this
may be true, these methods may lead to increased costs for the remote
vendors, who would be forced to prove it through expert testimony.212
Also, if a state employs the procedures that require verification of the
purchases that are necessary for compliance, there is virtually nothing to
stop companies from purchasing the best quality items, such as
computers, and use them for other business practices on top of sales and
use tax compliance.213 Overcompensation is problematic in that it may
lead to the resentment of taxpayers who are essentially paying entities

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See id.
See id. at 526–27.
See id. at 527.
See id.
See id. at 510–11.
See id. at 511.
See id. at 510–11.
See id. at 509–10.
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who are not responsive to their wants and needs.214 On the other hand,
under-compensation could induce increased prices for consumers by
companies that are not reimbursed fully and need to find funds
elsewhere.215
Any of the various procedures recommended by Gamage and
Heckman to implement an Adequate Vendor Compensation scheme will
likely demand more resources for the states’ tax collection agencies, as a
new system of collecting taxes would be implemented.216 The
administration of these new procedures would likely require added
funding.217 Gamage and Heckman also concede that their Adequate
Vendor Compensation proposal may not stand should it reach the
Supreme Court.218 They argue that there would not be an issue with
Quill if the courts apply a modern economic analysis of the Commerce
Clause, as the proposal seeks to eliminate burdens on interstate
commerce for the remote vendor companies.219 However, as with any
legal issue, the courts have the final say in the legitimacy of a stateimplemented Adequate Vendor Compensation scheme.220
B. CURRENT COLLECTION METHODS AND TOOLS OF STATES THAT IMPOSE
USE TAX
Today there are forty-five states that impose sales and use taxes.221
Presently, the most common way for these states to collect the tax is

214. Robert D. Feinman, Tax Resentment – Why?, DAILY KOS (Apr. 15, 2009, 6:31
AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2009/04/15/720251/-Tax-Resentment-Why.
215. Matt Krantz, Amazon.com Could See Price Advantage Fade with Sales Tax,
USA TODAY (July 6, 2012, 10:09 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/
columnist/krantz/story/2012-06-26/amazoncom-collecting-sales/55846702/1.
216. See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 16, at 509–11.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 515 (“Note that we do not mean to suggest that states could impose
use tax compliance burdens on remote vendors with no fear of these burdens being
ruled unconstitutional as long as the states adequately compensate the vendors for all
compliance costs.”).
219. See id. at 516.
220. See id. (“Although we cannot guarantee that courts will agree with our analysis,
we think that the arguments supporting the constitutionality of our proposed approach
are more than persuasive enough to make our approach the best way forward for states
that wish to raise revenue by taxing interstate e-commerce.”).
221. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23.
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through residents’ individual income tax returns.222 Of the forty-five,
twenty-seven states provide the option for consumers to report use taxes
through their individual income tax returns.223 The states also include
pertinent use tax instructions within the associated tax booklet to the
income tax returns.224 The remaining eighteen states require consumers
that are liable for use tax to report through a separate use tax reporting
form.225 More and more states are allowing taxpayers to fill out their
individual income tax returns, and in relevant cases, their consumer use
tax returns online.
1. Reporting on Individual Income Tax Return
Many states include a line for use tax on their individual income tax
return forms in order to encourage use tax payment.226 Eleven of these
states227 emphasize the use tax line by bolding the typeface, while one
puts the text of the use tax line in red.228 The directions to fill out the
use tax line vary from state to state, but most states incorporate a
worksheet within the individual income tax reporting form instruction
booklet.229 The use tax worksheet requires taxpayers to complete an
equation to determine their use tax.230 The taxpayer must compute the
total amount of goods and services purchased through the Internet, mailorder catalogs, or in another state and multiply that amount by the

222. See id. at 2 (“Of these 38 states [that have an individual income tax], 25
provide for taxpayers to report use tax obligations on the individual income tax return . .
. .”).
223. See id.
224. See id. at 5.
225. See id.
226. See, e.g., Use Tax for Individuals: Tax Bulletin ST-913, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF
TAXATION & FIN. (June 17, 2010), http://www.tax.ny.gov/pubs_and_bulls/tg_bulletins/
st/use_tax_for_individuals.htm; Illinois Use Tax, ILL. REVENUE, http://tax.illinois.gov/
Individuals/Illinois-Use-Tax.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2013); Utah State Tax Comm’n,
Utah Use Tax for Internet and Catalog Purchases, UTAH INCOME TAXES,
http://incometax.utah.gov/topics/use-tax (last updated Nov. 28, 2012).
227. California, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, New York,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia bold their use tax lines.
228. Illinois utilizes red font for its use tax line.
229. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 5–8.
230. See, e.g., Individual Consumer’s Use Tax, MO. DEP’T OF REVENUE,
http://dor.mo.gov/personal/consumer/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2013); Utah State Tax
Comm’n, supra note 221.
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state’s tax rate (and in some cases the local jurisdiction’s tax rates as
well).231 Then, the taxpayer would subtract the amount of sales tax that
he or she had already paid on the purchase to obtain the total amount of
use tax owed.232 Sometimes, these worksheets are not located within the
individual income tax reporting instruction manual, but are located on
other forms that the states’ departments of revenue provide.233
As states have realized that consumers may not keep track of their
purchases that are subject to use taxes, twelve states, by Manzi’s count,
have presented an alternative to the use tax worksheets by providing
lookup tables.234 These lookup tables allow taxpayers to determine the
estimated amount of use tax owed through a chart that corresponds with
their taxable income.235 The taxpayers simply find the bracket that
designates their taxable income and look across the chart to determine
the approximate amount of use tax owed.236 At least one state,
Pennsylvania, even includes the use tax owed within jurisdictions with
different tax rates.237 Although states encourage the taxpayer to report
the amount of use tax owed on relevant purchases in addition to the
amount found within the lookup table, many states will accept the
lookup table amount as the total use tax liability owed.238 Most states,
however, do require that the lookup tables only be used when the total
amount of purchases subject to use tax is less than $1,000.239
a. Benefits of Reporting on an Individual Income Tax Return
States that collect income taxes are moving towards including a use
tax line on the individual income tax returns to increase use tax
compliance.240 There are a number of benefits to reporting the use tax
231.
232.
233.

See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 5–8.
See id.
See, e.g., MO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 230; Consumer Use Tax Return,
TENN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, https://apps.tn.gov/usetax/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
234. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 8–9.
235. See id.; see, e.g., PA-40 Instructions, PENN. DEP’T OF REVENUE,
http://www.revenue.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/document/1209874/use_tax_pa40_instru
ctions_pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
236. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 8–9.
237. See, e.g., PENN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 235.
238. See id.; N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN., supra note 226.
239. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 8 (“Only one state
(Kansas) allows taxpayers with purchases over $1,000 to use the lookup table to
estimate liability.”).
240. See id. at 2.
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on a state’s individual income tax return.241 These advantages consist of
taxpayer knowledge of the use tax and convenience.242 There are also
benefits for including lookup tables as a tool for taxpayers, such as
convenience and certainty.243
The reason why use tax compliance is so low is that taxpayers are
unaware that the tax exists or are unsure of what purchases are subject to
use tax.244 One of the main benefits of including the use tax line on an
individual income tax return is that taxpayers will become aware of the
tax.245 By including the use tax line on the individual income tax return,
the taxpayer will at least be able to choose whether or not to report his
or her use tax owed.246 For those taxpayers that are not able to use the
individual income tax return due to their large amount of purchases
subject to use tax, they can continue to fill out the separate use tax
return.247 By including the use tax line on the individual income tax
return, it is more straightforward to taxpayers and makes it convenient
for them to compute their total tax liability on one form.248 The
inclusion of the use tax on the individual income tax return may also
allow for fewer resources to be used, as a separate form becomes
unnecessary.
The lookup tables are beneficial because they provide even more
convenience to taxpayers. Taxpayers will be able to use the lookup
tables to find an estimated amount of use tax liability based on their
taxable income.249 This allows for taxpayers that have not kept accurate
241.
242.

See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 7.
See, e.g., A Guide to Sales and Use Tax, MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE,
http://www.mass.gov/dor/individuals/taxpayer-help-and-resources/tax-guides/salesusetax-guide.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2013) (“For their convenience, individuals may
report and pay any Massachusetts use tax due on their personal income tax return,
Massachusetts Resident Tax Return . . . or WebFile for Income.”).
243. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 8–9.
244. See Gershel, supra note 5; Press Release, CCH, Use Tax: Taxpayers May Not
Know They Owe It, But More States Adding Line Item on Tax Return to Collect (Apr.
12, 2012), available at http://www.cchgroup.com/wordpress/index.php/pressrelease/use-tax-taxpayers-may-not-know-they-owe-it-but-more-states-adding-line-itemon-tax-return-to-collect-cch-says/.
245. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 7–9.
246. See Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS.
111, 136 (2009).
247. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23.
248. See id. at 8.
249. See id.
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records of their purchases subject to use tax to find an amount that
approximates what their use tax should be.250 Taxpayers are more likely
to choose to utilize the lookup tables rather than compute the use tax
worksheet because it is less complicated and time-consuming.251 As
taxpayers will presumably use the lookup tables to report their use tax
liability, the states’ departments of revenue will have a more guaranteed
stream of incoming tax revenue.252 The lookup table acts almost as a
default for those taxpayers that have not kept correct records for their
use tax computation.253 As a default, the states will have at least a
minimum amount reported and collected from these taxpayers rather
than nothing.254
b. Disadvantages of This Form of Collection
The disadvantages of adding the use tax line on the individual
income tax return consist of the refusal of taxpayers to look up and
complete the use tax worksheet within the instructions, as well as the
inability for taxpayers that have purchased more than $1000 of goods
and services subject to use tax to utilize the use tax line on the individual
income tax return.255 The lookup tables also have drawbacks. For some
taxpayers, lookup tables may result in reporting more than they are
liable for.256 From the perspective of the state, taxpayers may be
reporting less use tax than they are liable for.257
Furthermore, although the inclusion of the use tax line on the
individual income tax return is more convenient than having to fill out a
separate use tax return, the taxpayer may still choose not to complete the
worksheet. Those taxpayers who purchase many items or services
subject to use tax will not be able to use their individual income tax
return to report their use taxes.258 These taxpayers may choose not to fill
out the separate use tax return as it is more inconvenient, or they may
choose to under-represent their purchases in order to fill in the use tax
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 8–9.
See id.
See id. at 9.
See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN., supra note 226.
See Donald Morris, Tax Penalties and Deterrence: Determining Effectiveness
and Taxpayer Perception, CPA J., Sept. 2010, at 28.
257. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 8.
258. See id.

1122

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVIII

line on the individual income tax return.259 If these scenarios occur, the
state may continue to lose tax revenue.
Lookup tables have disadvantages for both taxpayers and the state.
Although more convenient, taxpayers may not opt to utilize the lookup
tables, as they may believe that the amount they owe according to the
table is higher than it should be.260 If the taxpayers think that the table
amount is too high, they may choose not to report any use tax at all.261
On the other hand, when taxpayers utilize the lookup tables, they may be
reporting and paying less than they actually owe in use tax.262 The
states’ department of revenue will have lost the true amount of use tax
that the taxpayer has owed.263
2. Reporting on a Separate Use Tax Return
Eighteen states require taxpayers to fill out a separate use tax
return.264 Some of these states do not collect individual income taxes
and therefore must collect the use tax through a consumer use tax
return.265 Others states, however, require the use tax return in addition
to the individual income tax return.266 The use tax return typically
employs a worksheet that assists the taxpayer in computing their use tax
liability. The computation of the use tax is the difference between the
sales tax that would apply in the applicable state and any sales tax that

259. See James Alm et al., Taxpayer Information Assistance Services and Tax
Compliance Behavior 5–7 (Tulane Univ., Economics Working Paper No. 1101, 2011);
Govind S. Iyer et al., Increasing Tax Compliance in Washington State: A Field
Experiment, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 7, 20–26 (2010). Although this study is about the
collection of use tax for businesses, it can be assumed that the experiment would
translate similarly for individuals.
260. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 7–9; see also Doran, supra
note 246, at 146–49.
261. See Nina E. Olson, Minding the Gap: A Ten-Step Program for Better Tax
Compliance, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 7, 27 (2009).
262. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 8–10.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 5.
265. See, e.g., Use Tax, DEP’T OF REVENUE, WASH. STATE, http://dor.wa.gov/
content/findtaxesandrates/usetax/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
266. See, e.g., TENN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 233; MO. DEP’T OF REVENUE,
supra note 230; Use Tax Form, S.D. DEP’T OF REVENUE (Nov. 2011)
http://www.state.sd.us/drr2/businesstax/publications/taxfacts/UseTaxEveryone%27s.pdf.
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was already paid at the time of purchase.267 The format of the worksheet
is virtually the same as the worksheets given within the individual
income tax return instructions.268 While some states only require an
annual filing of a consumer use tax return, others, such as Tennessee,
may allow for monthly or quarterly filing depending on the amount
spent on goods and services subject to use tax.269
a. Benefits of This Form of Collection
The benefit of having a separate use tax return for states without
income taxes is the ability to collect use taxes at all. States without
individual income taxes have limited alternatives in collecting use tax.270
The only practical alternative in these states is to issue a separate use tax
return.271 A separate use tax return may indicate to taxpayers that the
use tax is important and that they are required to report and pay it. By
having its own return form, the use tax may be taken more seriously
than if it had its own line on the individual tax return. Consumers may
also view the separate form as more compelling to fill out and return
rather than the line that can easily be left blank or filled in with a zero on
the individual income tax return.272
b. Disadvantages of This Form of Collection
There are some disadvantages associated with the separate use tax
return. These include the inconvenience of filling out another form,
especially one for a tax that many taxpayers simply do not know
exists.273 The separate form may also seem unimportant or irrelevant to
the taxpayer. Taxpayers may choose not to fill out the separate use tax
form because they may believe that the tax amount is too insignificant

267.
268.
269.
270.

See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 2.
See id. at 8–10.
See, e.g., TENN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 233.
See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 6–9 (showing various
collection methods for states with income tax returns such as adding a use tax line to
the income tax form or providing lookup tables with the individual tax return to
estimate owed use tax).
271. See id.
272. See id. at 6 (noting that of the twenty-two states that had a use income line on
their tax return, sixteen had less than 2% of users reporting any use tax at all).
273. See id. at 6–9 (“Some states that placed a use tax line on the income tax return
reported significant increases in collections.”).
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for the effort needed to fill out the form.274 Furthermore, the
inconvenience may deter the taxpayer from filling out the form
altogether.275 Taxpayers could also view the separate use tax return as
something that is not applicable to them if they do not take the time to
read it. Some states, including Utah, have discontinued mailing their tax
forms to taxpayers via postal service.276 If the taxpayer must go online
or to an office to obtain tax forms, the taxpayer may not seek out the use
tax return as he or she may be unaware of its existence or may just
forget.277
3. Notification of Use Taxes
There are states within both categories of use tax collection that
provide information about use taxes directly to taxpayers through their
income tax booklets and other communications.278 These states usually
have a higher compliance rate for use taxes.279 Notifications can come
in various forms, from media campaigns to reminder letters in the mail,
in order to create public awareness of the need to report use tax
liability.280 An example of a state that has utilized both media and
legislation for its use tax awareness campaign is Oklahoma.281 The
Oklahoma Tax Commission aired a television commercial in 2010
notifying consumers of their use tax liability when purchasing items
online.282 The commercial features a couple talking about purchasing a
television online.283 A man dressed in an elephant costume (as the
“elephant in the room”) appears behind the couple and reminds them to
274.
275.
276.

See id.
See Alm et al., supra note 259, at 5–7.
See, e.g., Utah Tax Information: Help with Forms and Publications, UTAH
STATE TAX COMM’N, http://tax.utah.gov/forms-pubs/help#paper (last updated Feb. 20,
2013); see also Utah Tax Information Filing Methods, UTAH STATE TAX COMM’N,
http://incometax.utah.gov/filing-methods/paper#obtaining (last updated Dec. 6, 2012).
277. See Wells, supra note 2 (showing that many consumers are unaware that the
use tax is already in effect in California).
278. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 6–9.
279. See id. at 7–8; see also Iyer et al., supra note 259.
280. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 6–9; see also Iyer et al.,
supra note 259.
281. See Ed Murray, Most Oklahomans Shopping Online Unaware of ‘User Tax’,
NEWS9.COM (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.news9.com/global/story.asp?s=13681316.
282. See id.
283. See id.
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keep their receipt for the purchase, as they will owe use tax on the
item.284 The couple seems to not be able to hear the elephant, and the
wife then asks whether they will owe taxes on the purchase.285 The
elephant, now resting in an armchair with a newspaper, responds that
yes, they will have to pay use tax.286 The commercial cuts to a blue
tinted screen with the words “Use Tax Funding” and listing various
projects the tax will supposedly fund, including those projects for
education, police, and fire.287 At the end of the commercial, the woman
picks a peanut up off of the floor and scratches her head, puzzled.288 In
2010, the Oklahoma legislature also passed a law that requires remote
vendors to “provide notification on its retail Internet website or retail
catalog and invoices provided to its customers that use tax is imposed
and must be paid by the purchaser . . . .”289 The efforts to increase the
awareness of the use tax were successful as the number of tax returns
with use tax remittance increased from 2010–11.290
There is also evidence that the increased notification of use tax
penalties, as well as detection, creates better compliance.291 A
Washington State study discovered that a mailing campaign designed to
familiarize taxpayers with the ramifications of not paying taxes and
details of detection efforts had an effect of higher use tax compliance.292
The experiment measured use tax compliance based upon receipt of
notification letters.293 Each participant received a letter either containing
information about penalties for not reporting use tax, information on
increased detection methods of not reporting use tax, both sets of
information, or neither set of information.294 Participants in the study
were not aware that they were involved in an experiment.295 The study
found that participants who received the letters without the penalty or
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1406.1(a) (2010).
See Joe Wertz, Most Oklahoma Tax Filers Don’t Pay ‘Unenforceable’ Use
Tax, STATE IMPACT (Dec. 14, 2011, 12:54 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/
2011/12/14/most-oklahoma-tax-filers-don%E2%80%99t-pay-unenforceable-use-tax/.
291. See Iyer et al., supra note 259, at 10–13.
292. See id. at 16–26 (illustrating results of field experiment for use tax
compliance).
293. See id. at 15.
294. See id.
295. See id.

1126

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVIII

detection notification had the lowest reported use tax base.296 The final
results indicated that information regarding both detection and penalties,
separately or together, influence taxpayer behavior.297
a. Benefits of Notification of Use Taxes
State campaigns to create awareness of use taxes have multiple
benefits. Taxpayers are unable to pay taxes on which they are not aware
of. A media or mailing campaign produces knowledge of the tax, and
also reminds taxpayers that the tax is important to the state budget.298
The notification of penalties and potential detection of tax evasion also
prompts taxpayers to report use tax, as they are aware that the state is
taking its collection seriously.299 The awareness campaign may also
demonstrate to the taxpayer that their state department of revenue wants
to aid the taxpayer in complying with the tax laws.300
b. Disadvantages of the Notification of Use Taxes
There are several disadvantages of a campaign to create awareness
of use tax. Taxpayers may already feel that they pay too many taxes.301
Although the use tax has been incorporated in most states’ tax codes
since the early twentieth century, most taxpayers are unaware of its
existence.302 The campaign may spark feelings of resentment for the
government. Although more taxpayers will presumably comply with tax
laws when they become aware of how to calculate the correct amount,303
taxpayers are not necessarily ecstatic about parting with their hard
earned money. In addition, a notification campaign costs resources.
296.
297.
298.
299.

See id. at 21–23, 26.
See id. at 26.
See Iyer et al., supra note 259, at 8–11.
See id.; see also Ashlea Ebeling, The Tax Return Line Item You Likely
“Overlooked” (But Shouldn’t Have), FORBES, April 17, 2012, available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2012/04/17/the-tax-return-line-item-youlikely-overlooked-but-shouldnt-have/.
300. See Olson, supra note 261, at 29–33.
301. See id.; see also Maureen Turner, Taxpayers, Thank You!, VALLEY ADVOCATE
(Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.valleyadvocate.com/article.cfm?aid=16562 (“If you’re like a
lot of Americans, you may consider paying your taxes to be a thankless task. Maybe
you feel that you pay too much and get too little in return.”).
302. See Gershel, supra note 5; Press Release, CCH, supra note 244.
303. See Alm et al., supra note 259, at 22.
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The effort will expend already scarce state resources.304 If the campaign
is not successful, it may cost more than the revenue it seeks to collect.
4. Penalties & Exemption Periods
Many states employ penalties and interest for the noncompliance of
reporting use tax liability.305 Historically these penalties have been
implemented in order to deter people from evading their tax liability.306
Some states, including Maine, have also implemented periods of
exemption from these penalties and interest in order to incentivize
taxpayers to comply with use tax reporting requirements.307 As with
most taxes, if a taxpayer does not report or pay his or her taxes within
the given period, penalties and interest accrue on the amount owed.308
Many taxpayers are unaware of the possibility of penalties and
interest.309 States rely on penalties and interest of inaccurate or late tax
payments as a part of their revenue.310 However, many taxpayers resent
that they must pay even more money to the government if they do not
calculate their taxes correctly or file their returns late.311
An exemption period is a length of time designated by a state
within which taxpayers will not be penalized with interest and penalties
if they report and pay their use tax.312 In Maine, these exemption
periods may last one month or two.313 Again, usually states allow for
taxpayers to report and pay their use tax online.

304.
305.
306.
307.

See Iyer et al., supra note 259, at 29.
See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN., supra note 226.
See Morris, supra note 256, at 28.
See, e.g., Use Tax Compliance Program Established, GEN. INFO. BULL. NO. 102
(Maine Revenue Servs.), Aug. 16, 2012, at 2–3, available at http://www.maine.gov/
revenue/salesuse/GIB102FINAL.pdf (announcing establishment of a use tax
compliance program for delinquent use tax taxpayers).
308. See, e.g., id. (“A participating taxpayer that timely submits the Special Use Tax
Return with no material misrepresentations or material omissions and that timely pays
the entire use-tax liability is absolved from further liability for unreported and
unassessed use tax incurred prior to January 1, 2012, and is also absolved from liability
for criminal prosecution and civil penalties related to those taxes for those years.”).
309. See Iyer et al., supra note 259, at 14.
310. See generally Morris, supra note 256, at 28.
311. See Olson, supra note 261, at 26–27.
312. See, e.g., Use Tax Compliance Program Established, supra note 307.
313. See id.
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a. Benefits of Penalties & Exemption Periods
The implementation of penalties and interest on the use tax may
have beneficial consequences. The threat of penalties may deter some
taxpayers from not reporting their use tax liability inaccurately or
untimely.314 While penalties may not be advantageous to the individual
taxpayer, they tend to add more revenue to the state’s budget.315 Either
way the state gains in that its revenue base increases when taxpayers
owe penalties or pay their correct amount of liability.316 Exemption
periods may also be beneficial. Taxpayers may take advantage of
exemption periods rather than risk the chance of owing penalties and
interest on their inaccurate tax return.317 The exemption period may also
demonstrate to the taxpayer that the state does not want to punish the
consumer for something that he or she has not been aware of.318 As a
result, exemption periods may generate a better image for the state’s
department of revenue.319 The improved impression of the department

314. See Morris, supra note 256, at 32–33 (“Researchers have found that taxpayers
are aware of some penalties, and their deterrent effect is evidenced by the fact that
taxpayers diversify their tax cheating to minimize the imposition of penalties. In
particular, one study found ‘marked variations in compliance levels across line items
[on a tax return] which appear to be systematically related to the difficulty of
establishing noncompliance and the penalties for detected noncompliance.’ It was also
found that reminding taxpayers about potential legal sanctions shortly before they file
their tax returns resulted in an increase in the amount of income reported compared to a
control group where no such reminder was given.”) (internal citations omitted); see also
Iyer et al., supra note 259, at 11–13.
315. See Morris, supra note 256, at 28.
316. See id. (“Although penalties raise revenue, they are also sanctions assumed to
act as deterrents, and their deterrent effect has been the subject of study.”).
317. See Tom Porter, Maine Tax Amnesty Initiative Fails to Deliver Expected
Revenues, MAINE PUBLIC BROADCASTING NETWORK (Nov. 29, 2012),
http://www.mpbn.net/News/MPBNNewsforVillageSoup/tabid/1144/ctl/ViewItem/mid/
3695/ItemId/24924/Default.aspx.
318. See Olson, supra note 261, at 26 (“[T]axpayers generally want to comply with
the tax laws and that if the IRS treats them with courtesy and respect and provides
reasonable opportunities to resolve a tax liability if they lapse, overall tax compliance
will improve. This approach has its basis in the belief that the traditional economic
model of tax compliance does not entirely explain our current high compliance levels
and that something else is at work, sometimes called ‘tax morale.’”).
319. See generally id.
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of revenue may ease the taxpayers’ pains of paying their taxes and
increase compliance.320
b. Disadvantages of Penalties & Exemption Periods
Penalties and interest accrued on inaccurate use tax liability may
also have negative consequences. The taxpayers may view penalties on
use tax as another unwarranted seizure of their income.321 As a result,
the taxpayers may spite states’ departments of revenue by not reporting
the correct use tax liability.322 Even if there is a deterrence effect, the
penalty may not be able to encourage correct use tax liability because
taxpayers may have difficulty computing the accurate amount of use tax
they owe.323 Penalties are only available pursuant to an audit on the
individual.324 The state cannot audit every taxpayer annually, and
taxpayers may risk the penalty in order to pay lower use tax liability.325
Exemption periods have potential negative consequences as well.
When penalties and interest are waived, there is a loss of income from
that stream of revenue.326 If the exemption period is not successful in
incentivizing more taxpayers to come forward and report their correct
use tax liability, the state may lose money that it could have gained from
the penalties at that time.327 Exemption periods may also demonstrate
that taxpayers in general are not reporting or paying their correct amount
of use tax liability.328 When taxpayers believe that others are cheating
the system, they lose motivation to pay their taxes.329 Thus, exemption
periods may in fact discourage the correct use tax liability reporting and
payment.

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

See generally id.
See id. at 26–29.
See Morris, supra note 256, at 33.
See Alm et al., supra note 259, at 2–5.
See Iyer et al., supra note 259, at 12–13.
See Morris, supra note 256, at 32.
See Porter, supra note 317.
See id.
See id.
See Olson, supra note 261, at 27; see also Morris, supra note 256, at 29, 33.
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c. De Minimis Exemptions
At least three states have unique exemptions for taxpayers who
spend less than a certain amount of money on items subject to use tax.330
These are called de minimis exemptions.331 Although the de minimis
exemption is beneficial to individual taxpayers that do not purchase
many items subject to use tax, the state loses revenue by waiving the use
tax liability on these purchases.332 The limit to the total amount of
purchases subject to the de minimis exemption varies from state to
state.333 This exemption may also have other restrictions, such as the
purchases may only be from a mail-order catalog.334 It is beneficial to
taxpayers that do not purchase many items subject to use tax. It also
encourages taxpayers to limit their spending on items outside of the state
in order to promote in-state business. The de minimis exemption,
however, does retract from the revenue base in that the state does not
collect the tax that would be applicable had the exemption not existed.335
5. Relationship between Taxpayer and the States’ Departments of
Revenue
Finally, there is a theory that compliance with the tax code will
increase when there is a positive relationship between the taxpayer and
the department of revenue.336 A positive impression of the department
of revenue reassures the taxpayer that their taxes are being put to good
use.337 Positive relationships between the taxpayer and department of
revenue may be obtained by reminding taxpayers what projects their
taxes are funding, as well as increasing personal interaction between
330. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 3–4; see, e.g., Individual
Use Tax, MINN. REVENUE, http://www.revenue.state.mn.us/individuals/use_tax_individ/
Pages/Individual_Use_Tax.aspx (last updated May 25, 2013); MO. DEP’T OF REVENUE,
supra note 230; Consumer’s Use Tax, VA. DEP’T OF TAXATION,
http://www.tax.virginia.gov/site.cfm?alias=ConsumersUseTax (last updated Feb. 25,
2013).
331. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 3–4. Minnesota, Missouri,
and Virginia have types of de minimis exemptions.
332. See id. at 11–14.
333. See sources cited supra note 3300.
334. See VA. DEP’T OF TAXATION, supra note 330.
335. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 11–14.
336. See Olson, supra note 261, at 27–33.
337. See id. at 26–28.
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department of revenue employees and taxpayers.338 The ability to seek
assistance from the department of revenue in computing tax also
increases the department’s reputation.339 The departments of revenue
have nothing to lose and everything to gain by trying to better their
relationship with the taxpayers.
III. STATES SHOULD IMPLEMENT A COMBINATION OF CURRENT
PRACTICES TO MAXIMIZE USE TAX COLLECTION WITHOUT HAVING
TO CREATE NEW TAX COLLECTION SCHEMES
To rectify the current e-commerce use tax crisis, states should
implement the tools that they currently have in a more efficient
manner.340 States currently have the ability to collect more use tax
without sidestepping the law. Rather than attempt to dodge the law
established in Quill by implementing Amazon tax laws or other
alternatives,341 states should implement a combination of the current
practices that are already in place.342 By utilizing existing resources,
there will be no chance for a new Amazon tax law to be overturned and
it would be unnecessary to invest in the creation of an extended
bureaucracy.343
The use of these tools will also preserve the
responsibility of the consumer to report and pay use tax.344 Remote
vendors already are subject to sales taxes where they have substantial
physical nexuses.345 While remote vendors cannot advertise that their
services and items are not subject to tax, they do not have the duty to
collect use tax.346
The states’ departments of revenue should raise awareness of the
use tax, its applicability, and the penalties associated with the inaccurate
filing of use tax through various means.347 Some states may prefer to
send out mailings or pamphlets, while others may choose to create
public service announcements through the radio or commercials on

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

See id. at 27–33.
See id.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part II.B.
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television.348 The states that have income tax but still require taxpayers
to file a consumer use tax return should consider adding a use tax line on
the individual income tax return.349 States that utilize either the
individual income tax return or use tax return should evaluate
implementing lookup tables in order to increase use tax liability
reporting.350 The creation of a better taxpayer-department of revenue
relationship can also increase use tax compliance.351
A. REASONS WHY THE AMAZON TAX LAWS & INTERMEDIARY TAX
PROPOSAL SHOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED
The utilization of the current practices are better than the Amazon
tax laws and Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax proposal for a number of
reasons. The implementation of the Amazon tax laws and Cavanaugh’s
Intermediary Tax proposal may generate litigation costs as challenges to
the constitutionality of these tax schemes continue to occur.352 There
have been at least two states in which a challenge to an Amazon tax law
has been litigated, and there is at least one court that has held that the
state’s Amazon tax law unconstitutional.353 Continued challenges will
cost an enormous amount of resources in litigation.354 The possibility
that the tax scheme is in fact unconstitutional further raises the costs of
implementation.355 Even if the Amazon tax laws or Cavanaugh’s
Intermediary Tax scheme proposal survive constitutional challenges, the
state will have to spend money to increase the departments of
revenue.356 As more companies become liable under the proposed tax
scheme, the state will be required to allocate more resources to the
departments of revenue to collect and dispense the tax to the state.357
Remote vendor companies may also react by terminating their affiliate

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

See supra Part II.B.3.
See supra Part II.B.1–2.
See supra Part II.B.1–2.
See supra Part II.B.5.
See supra Part II.A.1–2.
See cases cited supra note 7.
See Robert W. Wood, Amazon Tax: Good, Bad, and Ugly, FORBES, Sept. 24,
2011, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2011/09/24/amazon-taxgood-bad-and-ugly/.
355. See generally id.
356. See supra Part II.A.1–2.
357. See supra Part II.A.1–2.

2013]

INCREASING TAX COMPLIANCE

1133

programs, as Amazon did in the state of Rhode Island, creating less
revenue for the state by eliminating a source of income tax.358
B. REASONS WHY THE ADEQUATE VENDOR COMPENSATION PROPOSAL
SHOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED
Gamage’s and Heckman’s Adequate Vendor Compensation
proposal will require an extraordinary amount of resources.359 This is so
because the departments of revenue will need to ensure that remote
vendors are fully compensated for their tax collections services.360
Under the proposed compensation scheme, the departments of revenue
will require resources and staff to establish a new system to determine
the costs attributed to remote vendors, especially those remote vendors
who can prove expenditures with invoices.361 Also, because Gamage’s
and Heckman’s Adequate Vendor Compensation proposal requires that
remote vendors be overpaid to ensure that they are fully compensated,
there will be more resources allocated to the remote vendors rather than
to the budget.362 Again, the Adequate Vendor Compensation proposal is
founded in the idea that adequate compensation of remote vendors will
satisfy the law required in Quill, which may not be true.363
C. WHY CURRENT PRACTICES SHOULD BE EMBRACED AND UTILIZED
Research suggests that most taxpayers are unaware of use taxes and
their own potential use tax liability.364 Similarly, other reports
demonstrate that when taxpayers know that they owe these types of
taxes and are aware of the associated penalties, they comply by
reporting their liability.365 Mailings and public service announcements
are once-a-year investments.366 The change to include the use tax
liability on the individual income tax will result only in the nominal cost
required to create a new form and instruction booklet, while eliminating

358.
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360.
361.
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363.
364.
365.
366.

See supra Part II.A.1–2.
See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra Part II.A.3.
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the extra cost of creating a separate use tax return.367 While the state
will have to invest in the creation of lookup tables, the payoff is
increased compliance.368 As many of these practices are already utilized
to some extent, the need to expand the bureaucracy within each state’s
department of revenue will be minimal.369 In addition, the state will
avoid litigation costs by implementing practices that are unquestionably
constitutional.370 In regards to Gamage’s and Heckman’s Adequate
Vendor Compensation proposal, taxpayers will feel uncomfortable
knowing that remote vendors, including large corporations, receive more
compensation than they are entitled to.371
Although the Amazon tax laws, Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax
proposal, and Gamage’s and Heckman’s Adequate Vendor
Compensation proposal result in the guaranteed collection of sales tax
from its residents who may not have reported their use tax, the risk
associated with the constitutionality and cost of the implementation of
these theories is not worth the potential increase in revenue.372 The state
can increase use tax compliance through methods that are not as
resource dependent and are definitely constitutional.373 By employing
the practices described in Section B in a way that optimizes use tax
awareness as well as creating easier ways for taxpayers to calculate their
use tax, such as lookup tables, states will be able to increase their
revenue base while abiding by the law.374
The burden to report and pay use tax has always been on the
consumer.375 The collection of use taxes by remote vendors will not
eliminate use tax liability reporting on the part of the consumer.376 Use
taxes are applicable not only to online purchases and mail-order catalog
purchases, but also to purchases that were made physically within
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See supra Part II.B.
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See Alan D. Viard, Use Tax Collection on Interstate Sales: The Need for
Federal Legislation, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (Nov. 26, 2012),
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another state.377 Thus, although the collection of use taxes by remote
vendors may increase the amount of use taxes being collected by states,
individual use tax liabilities will still exist.378 The consumer is the only
party, with the exception of the state during an audit, who can calculate
how much use tax is owed to the state.379 The responsibility to report
the accurate amount of use tax rests on the consumer, not the companies
outside of the state with which they choose to do business.380
CONCLUSION
It is unnecessary for state legislatures to resort to the creation of tax
schemes such as the Amazon tax laws to increase use tax compliance.
Presently, the states have access to tools and practices that have the
ability to increase use tax compliance.381 The Amazon tax law schemes
and the proposed alternatives are not solutions for the problem of use tax
noncompliance.382 Even if these proposed methods prove to be
constitutional and available to states for aid in use tax collection,
taxpayers will continue to owe use tax through their purchases within
other states and from purchases through e-commerce, which does not
conform to the criteria put forth in the proposed tax schemes.383 There is
no need to create expensive, complex tax law schemes to fulfill
obligations that are already placed on consumers.384 The states are able
to use cost-effective tools that have proven to work in general tax
compliance.385 The solution to create higher use tax compliance is to
utilize the existing tools already in place today rather than invest in
overly risky and costly tax schemes that attempt to bypass the current
law.386
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